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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine recent decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court. The opening Note examines the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonzales II),1 where the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a party protected under a
restraining order a legitimate claim of entitlement to enforcement of
the restraining order.2 The second Note examines the United States
1. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
2. Amanda Quirke contributed this Note.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II),3
where the Court held that a city’s exercise of eminent domain power
in furtherance of an economic development plan satisfies the constitutional “public use” requirement.4
Our coverage of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions begins
with American Home Assurance Co. v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,5 where the court answered certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals involving the proper application of
Florida statutes governing comparative fault and restrictions on the
waiver of sovereign immunity.6 Our Florida Supreme Court coverage
continues with Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum (Boca Burger II),7 which
held that a plaintiff has an absolute right to amend its complaint
once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served and
a trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment; a defendant may assert an affirmative defense, including the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss; and an appellate court may,
in “appropriate circumstances,” impose sanctions on an appellee or
its lawyer for the frivolous defense of a patently erroneous trial court
order.8 Our final Note examines Sunset Harbour Condominium Ass’n
v. Robbins,9 where the Florida Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting assessment of value for the tax year on real property
improvements not substantially completed on January 1 comports
with the Florida Constitution’s just valuation requirement.10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A PROTECTED PARTY HAS NO LEGITIMATE
CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO ENFORCEMENT OF A RESTRAINING ORDER
WHICH WOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
(Gonzales II), 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
Respondent, Gonzales, claimed the Town of Castle Rock violated
her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on
the police department’s failure to enforce a restraining order against
her husband.11 Gonzales claimed the Town of Castle Rock deprived
her of her property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order without due process because the police department had “an official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
Melinda Parks contributed this Note.
908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005).
Maureen Walterbach contributed this Note.
912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005).
Jessica Slatten contributed this Note.
914 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005).
Richard Junnier contributed this Note.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonzales II), 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2800 (2005).
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restraining order violations” and “tolerate[d] the non-enforcement of
restraining orders by its police officers.”12 The Tenth Circuit held
Gonzales had a protected property interest in the enforcement of the
restraining order and the town deprived her of due process based on
the police department’s failure to take her seriously and enforce the
restraining order.13 On appeal by the Town of Castle Rock, the Supreme Court reversed and found Gonzales has no protected property
interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14
Respondent obtained a restraining order against her husband in
conjunction with a divorce proceeding.15 On June 22, 1999, respondent realized her three daughters were missing from the yard of the
family home and notified the police department at 7:30 p.m.16 Gonzales, suspecting her husband had taken the girls, showed the officers a
copy of the restraining order, but the officers stated “there was nothing they could do” and instructed her to call the police department if
the children did not return home by 10:00 p.m.17 Gonzales talked to
her husband on his cell phone at 8:30 p.m., in which he informed her
that he and the girls were at an amusement park in Denver.18 Gonzales called the police again and asked if they would check for her husband at the amusement park or put out an all points bulletin for her
husband.19 The police again suggested she should wait until 10:00
p.m. to see if her husband would return her daughters.20
She contacted the police at 10:10 p.m. but was instructed to wait
until midnight.21 After finding nobody at her husband’s apartment,
she called the police at 12:10 a.m. and was instructed to wait for an
officer to arrive.22 The officer never came to the apartment, so she
went to the police station at 12:50 a.m., where she was ignored.23 At
3:20 a.m., her husband went to the police station and opened fire

12. Id. at 2802 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 129(a), Gonzales II, 125
S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278)).
13. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Gonzales I), 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
14. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
15. Id. at 2800.
16. Id. at 2801.
17. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 126(a), Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct.
2796 (No. 04-278)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2801-02.
20. Id. at 2802.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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with a semiautomatic handgun.24 He was killed by return fire from
the police.25 All three daughters were found dead in his truck.26
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court is whether Gonzales
has an interest in the enforcement of a restraining order which is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.”28 An entitlement is created from “an independent source such as state law.”29 However, “[a]lthough the underlying substantive interest is created by ‘an independent source such
as state law,’ federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected
by the Due Process Clause.”30
The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado law created an entitlement
based on the language printed on the restraining order31 and a state
statute requiring enforcement under certain conditions.32 The Tenth
Circuit focused on the mandatory language in the Colorado statute,
including a requirement that “[a] peace officer shall arrest” and
“shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order.”33
The Tenth Circuit also found that the legislative intent behind the
statute was “to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing domestic abuse restraining orders” and that any other interpretation
“would render domestic abuse restraining orders utterly valueless.”34

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2803.
28. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
29. Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).
30. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 10
(1978)).
31. The language printed on the back of the restraining order contained an instruction to law enforcement officials stating:
YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS
RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD
BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT
FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE
INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO VIOLATE
ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS
BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS ORDER OR HAS
RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ORDER.
Id. at 2801.
32. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Gonzales I), 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004);
see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (2001).
33. Gonzales I, 366 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6803.5(3) (2001)).
34. Id. at 1108-09.
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Contrary to the findings of the Tenth Circuit, the majority found
the Colorado statute did not create an entitlement because it did not
impose a mandatory requirement to enforce restraining orders.35 This
interpretation reconciled the statutory language with the “deeprooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of
seemingly mandatory legislative commands.”36 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in
their discretion.”37
The majority also found that obligations of the police department
are different when the subject of the order is not present, noting the
fact that Gonzales’s husband was not present and his whereabouts
were unknown.38 Citing other cases which found that an arrest may
be impossible when the alleged abuser is not at the home, the Court
found the Colorado statute contemplated this situation by including
a provision that only required an officer to “seek a warrant for the
arrest” when an arrest would be “impractical” under the circumstances.39 Gonzales did not clearly identify whether she was entitled
to having her husband arrested, having the police seek a warrant, or
having them use reasonable means to enforce the restraining order.40
“Such indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory.
Nor can someone be safely deemed ‘entitled’ to something when the
identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.”41
The Supreme Court also found that even if there were an entitlement created under the Colorado statute, it may not create a property interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 The Court found the right to the enforcement of a restraining order does not “have some ascertainable monetary value”
and thus is not property under the “Roth-type property-asentitlement” line of cases.43 The property interest claimed by Gonzales arises incidentally from the government function of arresting
people who it has probable cause to believe have committed a crime.44
35. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2805.
36. Id. at 2806.
37. Id. at 2803.
38. Id. at 2807. The dissent disagrees with this fact, instead asserting the “ ‘scene’ of
the violation was wherever the husband was currently holding the daughters, [so] this case
does not implicate the question of an officer’s duties to arrest a person who has left the
scene and is no longer in violation of the restraining order.” Id. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2807 (majority opinion) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (2001)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2809.
43. Id. See generally Thomas W. Merill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885, 964 (2000).
44. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
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“[A]n indirect and incidental result of the Government’s enforcement
action . . . does not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life,
liberty, or property.”45
In the concurrence, Justice Souter found that another flaw is
Gonzales’s claim to a property interest in a state mandated process.46
He cited precedent which said that “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.
Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to
which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”47 Thus,
the Court has always made a distinction between a substantive interest and the process required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect that interest. Finding that Gonzales had a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order would “collaps[e] the distinction between property protected and
the process that protects it.”48
The dissent found that there is an entitlement to enforcement of
restraining orders because in the domestic violence context, police
discretion is removed and enforcement is mandatory.49 Justice Stevens discredited the majority’s position that since Gonzales failed to
specify what police action she was entitled to, that the police action
cannot be mandatory.50 Stevens treated the statute as requiring
mandatory enforcement, whether it is to arrest the alleged offender,
seek a warrant, or use reasonable means to enforce the restraining
order.51
Focusing on the particular context of the restraining order in this
case, Justice Stevens noted that Colorado was one of many states
that passed mandatory arrest statutes in the mid-1990s to take “aim
at the crisis of police underenforcement in the domestic violence
sphere.”52 “The purpose of these statutes was precisely to ‘counter police resistance to arrests in domestic violence cases by removing or
45. Id. (quoting O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980)).
46. Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring).
47. Id. (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)).
48. Id.
49. Prior to its analysis of the case, the dissenting opinion takes issue with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Colorado law in conflict with the Tenth Circuit, because
the Supreme Court should defer to “the views of a federal court as to the law of a State
within its jurisdiction” unless the decision is “clearly wrong.” Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 542 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)). The dissent
suggests a proper method would have been to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme
Court in alignment with the principles of federalism, to “avoid[] the unnecessary adjudication of difficult questions of constitutional law” and to promote “judicial economy and fairness to the parties.” Id. at 2816.
50. Id. at 2819.
51. Id. at 2819-20.
52. Id. at 2817. Studies during that time period showed police officers only arrested alleged abusers three to ten percent of the time, and thirteen percent of the time when the victim had visible injuries. Id. at 2818 (citing Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, but Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 542).
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restricting police officer discretion; mandatory arrest policies would
increase police response and reduce batterer recidivism.’ ”53
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority’s rigid view of property
as something that has some ascertainable monetary value, noting
that “our cases have found ‘property’ interests in a number of stateconferred benefits and services.”54 In addition, the dissent analogized
Gonzales’s interest in enforcement of the restraining order to a private contract for security services, which has “some ascertainable
monetary value” and would certainly qualify as a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
“The fact that it is based on a statutory enactment and a judicial order entered for her special protection, rather than on a formal contract, does not provide a principled basis for refusing to consider it
‘property’ worthy of constitutional protection.”56
Justice Stevens’s dissent focused more on the context and facts of
the case to find the Colorado statute imposed a mandatory requirement for police to enforce the restraining order. “[T]he crucial point is
that, under the statute, the police were required to provide enforcement; they lacked the discretion to do nothing.”57 Thus, in Justice
Stevens’s view, since Gonzales “had a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, state officials could not deprive
her of that interest without observing fair procedures.”58
In contrast, the majority focused on the discretion vested in a police officer to enforce a restraining order; it found Gonzales did not
have a legitimate claim of entitlement and thus had no property interest which would be protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, a protected party has no cause of
action against a police department for failure to enforce a restraining
order, as the benefit that a third party may receive from having
someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in
its “substantive” manifestations. This result reflects our continuing
reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as “a font of tort
law.”59

53. Id. at 2817 (quoting Emily Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for
the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670).
54. Id. at 2822.
55. Id. at 2823 n.19.
56. Id. at 2823-44.
57. Id. at 2819-20.
58. Id. at 2824. Alluding to the tragic facts of this particular case, Stevens notes, “At
the very least, due process requires that the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the
claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision.” Id.
59. Id. at 2810 (majority opinion).

534

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:527

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A CITY’S EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
POWER IN FURTHERANCE OF AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN
SATISFIES CONSTITUTIONAL “PUBLIC USE” REQUIREMENT—Kelo v.
City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
In December 2000, nine petitioners brought an action in the New
London Superior Court60 claiming that the taking of their properties
by the City of New London for economic development purposes violated the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.61 The superior court granted petitioners’ request for permanent injunctive relief for a portion of the property included in petitioners’ complaint. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld
the taking as constitutional, concluding that “economic development
projects created and implemented . . . that have the public economic
benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and
contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the public use clauses of
the state and federal constitutions.”62 On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed.63
The City of New London (“City”), a “distressed municipality,” was
targeted for economic revitalization because of high unemployment
and a decline in total population throughout the 1990s.64 In the
search for some form of economic development, city leaders resurrected the private, nonprofit New London Development Corporation
(NLDC) and authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support its
planning activities.65 Additionally, the City hoped to benefit from the
erection of a $300 million research facility by pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc.66

60. See Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).
61. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the above quoted clause’s applicability to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
62. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004).
63. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2669.
64. Id. at 2658. In 1996, more than 1500 people lost jobs as a result of the federal government closing the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Fort Trumbull. Id. In 1998, the
City’s unemployment rate was almost double that of the State. Id. A population of slightly
less than 24,000 was the City’s lowest since 1920. Id.
65. Id. at 2659. The NLDC was originally created in 1978 to aid the City with economic development. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 508. The statutory provision authorizing such creation states in pertinent part: “Any municipality which has a planning commission is authorized, by vote of its legislative body, to designate the economic development commission
or the redevelopment agency of such municipality or a nonprofit development corporation
as its development agency and exercise through such agency the powers granted under this
chapter . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-188 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement).
66. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. In 1998, Pfizer Inc. announced plans to develop a global
research facility on a site adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 508.
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In 2000, the City approved an NLDC development plan67 that was
“projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including
its downtown and waterfront areas.”68 The NLDC plan focused on
ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of New London and encompassed seven parcels intended to “capitalize on the arrival of the
Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract” and
to “make the City more attractive and . . . create leisure and recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park.”69 To accomplish its plan, NLDC was authorized by the City to use eminent domain, if necessary, to acquire the needed land.70 After successfully
purchasing most of the real estate in the ninety-acre area, negotiations with petitioners failed.71
Petitioner Kelo bought her Fort Trumbull waterfront house in
1997 and has since made extensive improvements.72 Petitioner “Dery
was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there”
ever since, including sixty years with her current husband.73 Overall,
nine petitioners owned fifteen properties in Fort Trumbull, which
were either owner-occupied or held for investment purposes.74 Four
properties were in Parcel 3 of the development plan, and eleven were
in Parcel 4A.75 There was no evidence that any of these properties
were blighted or in poor condition; rather, as petitioners allege, they
were the subject of condemnation “only because they happen to be located in the development area.”76
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether a
city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic develop67. Economic, environmental, and social ramifications were studied. Kelo II, 125 S.
Ct. at 2659 n.2. Six alternative development proposals were evaluated with an ultimate
conclusion by the Office of Planning and Management that the project was within state
and municipal development policies. Id.
68. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 507.
69. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. Parcel 1 is designated for a waterfront conference hotel
that will include restaurants, shopping and marinas; Parcel 2 will have eighty new residences and space for a new U.S. Coast Guard Museum; Parcel 3 is located immediately
north of the Pfizer facility with 90,000 square feet of research and development office
space; Parcel 4A will be used to either support the adjacent state park with parking or retail services or to support the marina; Parcel 4B will include a renovated marina and the
final stretch of the riverwalk; Parcels 5, 6, and 7 will provide land for office and retail
space, parking and water-dependent commercial uses. Id.
70. Id. at 2660. The statute relied on by the City states in pertinent part that “[t]he
development agency may, with the approval of the legislative body, and in the name of the
municipality, acquire by eminent domain real property located within the project area.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement).
71. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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ment satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”77 Relying heavily on its previous decisions in Berman v.
Parker78 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,79 a 5-4 Court
found for the City.80 The Court’s holding stands for the proposition
that modern eminent domain law does not distinguish between public use and public purpose.
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that “the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”81 However, “it is equally clear that a State may transfer
property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.”82 The Court, though, relied on neither of these propositions to dispose of the case.83 Instead, the Court
broadened the issue to “whether the City’s development plan serves a
‘public purpose’ ”84 and discussed at length cases supporting the
Court’s rejection of “any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.”85
First, in Berman, the Court upheld the exercise of eminent domain to condemn a department store, itself unblighted, located in a
blighted area of Washington, D.C.86 The condemnation was in accordance with a redevelopment plan authorized by statute.87 To justify
condemning the thriving department store, the Court explained that
“community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.”88

77. Id. at 2661.
78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
79. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
80. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, Justice Kennedy concurred with an opinion, and
Justice O’Connor dissented with an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
81. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2663 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 2662 (emphasis added) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
244 (1984)).
86. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
87. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790 (1946). Section 2 of
the Act made a “legislative determination”:
[O]wing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and other
factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as
dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of Government
by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary
and appropriate for the purpose . . . .
§ 2. The Act neither defined “slums” nor “blighted areas.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.1.
88. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
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Instead, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, announced “[i]t is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”89 In other words, it is up
to the legislature to determine whether the condemnation meets a
public purpose. Furthermore, the Court determined that there is no
need for the public to actually use the condemned property as long as
the condemnation furthers a legitimate public purpose.90
Next, in Midkiff, a unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed Berman’s deferential approach to legislative judgments in declaring a
public purpose. In Midkiff, the Court upheld a statute whereby fee title was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees (for compensation) in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership.91 The
Court concluded that the State’s purpose of eliminating the “social
and economic evils of a land oligopoly” qualified as a valid public
use.92 The Court further explained that “it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics,” that matters in determining public
use.93 Therefore, even if the State was taking property from one
landowner and giving it to another, which traditionally was not allowed under the public use clause, the purpose stated in Midkiff was
found constitutional.
In Kelo, the Court relied principally on three factors to determine
that economic revitalization constituted sufficient public use. First,
the City had a carefully formulated economic development plan that
it believed would provide appreciable benefits to the area, including
new jobs and increased tax revenue:
Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our
review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but
rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.94

Next, the Court relied on the precedents embodied in Berman and
Midkiff to dispense with petitioners’ arguments that economic devel89. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
90. Id. The Court stated that it is solely up to Congress to determine how the property
is to be used once it has determined that a public purpose has been established. Id.
91. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984). The Hawaii Housing
Authority was required to hold a public hearing to determine whether the condemnation
by the State “will effectuate the public purposes” of the Act. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
516-22 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation). If so, acquisition of the land was thereby
authorized. Id.
92. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42.
93. Id. at 244.
94. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
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opment does not qualify as a public use and that using eminent domain for economic development crosses the boundary between public
and private takings.95 In Berman, the Court endorsed the purpose of
transforming a blighted area into a “well-balanced” community
through redevelopment.96 In Midkiff, the Court upheld the interest in
breaking up a land oligopoly that “created artificial deterrents to the
normal functioning of the State’s residential land market.”97 Accordingly, the Court claimed “[i]t would be incongruous to hold that the
City’s interest in the economic benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than
any of those . . . interests,” and found “no basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of
public purpose.”98 Furthermore, “the government’s pursuit of a public
purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”99 In rejecting
the unconstitutionality of the idea that under the redevelopment
plan land would be leased or sold to private developers for redevelopment, the Court acknowledged “ ‘[t]he public end may be as well or
better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.’ ”100
Finally, the Court restated its deference to federalism and state
decisionmaking and decided not to second-guess the effectiveness of
the City’s development plan or its determinations about what land is
necessary to carry out the project.101 “ ‘When the legislature’s purpose
is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be
carried out in the federal courts.’ ”102 Accordingly, the Court found
95. Id. at 2665-66.
96. Id. at 2665 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 26, 33).
97. Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
98. Id. at 2665-66. The City relied upon the Connecticut Legislature’s declaration of
policy in municipal development projects:
It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon
the continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisition and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commercial plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance
with local, regional and state planning objectives . . . that permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water areas . . .
in distressed municipalities . . . are public uses and purposes for which public
moneys may be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the
provisions of this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-186 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement).
99. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
100. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 34).
101. Id. at 2668.
102. Id. at 2667 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242). The Court diffused the parade of
horribles argument by stating that the Takings Clause “ ‘operates as a conditional limita-
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that a rule requiring postponement of every condemnation pending
judicial approval would be too burdensome on states in successfully
implementing redevelopment plans.103
In her dissent, Justice O’Connor accused the majority of effectively deleting the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause.104
Although Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Midkiff, her
dissent here declared that if economic development meets the public
use requirement, there is no longer a distinction between private and
public use of property.105
Justice O’Connor explained that the exceptional circumstances in
the cases cited by the majority warranted legislative deference. For
example, the eradication of blight and slums in Berman and the
elimination of oligopoly in Midkiff were cases where the “extraordinary precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society.”106 These rare circumstances clearly were not
present in Kelo, and the majority’s application of such legislative deference “significantly expands the meaning of public use.”107
Succinctly summarizing her opinion of the majority’s reasoning,
Justice O’Connor declared, “Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory.”108 Further, “[s]tates play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution . . . is
not among them.”109
Justice Thomas raised similar concerns in his dissent and agreed
that the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that public
use means public purpose rather than use by the public were exceptions to the rule.110 In fact, Justice Thomas characterized the Court’s
proclaimed deferential standard as “deeply perverse” and urged the
Court to return to the original meaning of the public use clause, from
which the Court has clearly deviated.111

tion, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.’ ” Id. at
2667 n.19 (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Further, the Court refused to consider cases executed outside of an integrated development
plan, simply stating that “the hypothetical cases . . . can be confronted if and when they
arise.” Id. at 2667. Assuming that the City was exercising its power within its authority,
the Court found no need to craft “an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.” Id.
103. Id. at 2668.
104. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2674.
107. Id. at 2675.
108. Id. at 2676.
109. Id. at 2677.
110. Id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2687.
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However, until the Court revisits this issue, it will be up to the
states to decide whether to increase the burden on the government’s
exercise of eminent domain. The majority’s “broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’ ”112 no doubt sets a
standard that can easily be met, at least in federal court, for most
condemnation proceedings.
TORTS—SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY—THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN ACTIVE
TORTFEASOR SHOULD BE APPORTIONED TO THE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
PARTY UNDER FLORIDA’S COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTE AND
FLORIDA’S STATUTORY RESTRICTION ON THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INDEMNIFICATION PROVISION
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN A MUNICIPAL AGENCY AND A PRIVATE
ENTITY—American Home Assurance Co. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified four questions of
Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court because there was no controlling precedent for its pending case.113 The case originated in the
federal district court for the Middle District of Florida, and the court
of appeals consolidated several appeals for which the resolutions to
the certified questions applied.114
The case arose out of an incident in which an Amtrak passenger
train collided with a hauler rig stalled on the railroad tracks, damaging the combustion turbine engine the rig was carrying.115 The Kissimmee Utility Authority (KUA) entered into an agreement with Florida Municipal Power Agency (FMPA) for fifty percent of the ownership
of an electric power plant and to share electricity production costs.116
KUA then entered into a crossing agreement with CSX Transportation
(CSX) to construct, use, and maintain a road grade crossing over CSX’s
tracks, so vehicles and people could cross over the tracks to the power
plant.117 The agreement required KUA to “ ‘defend, indemnify, protect,
and save [CSX] harmless from and against’ certain designated losses
and casualties . . . [and] required KUA to indemnify any company
whose property was operated by CSX at the railroad crossing.”118
KUA contracted with General Electric (GE) for the purchase and
delivery of equipment for the plant.119 GE then contracted with Stew112. Id. at 2662 (majority opinion).
113. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 462-63
(Fla. 2005).
114. Id. at 462.
115. Id. at 463-64.
116. Id. at 463.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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art & Stevenson Services, Inc. (S&S) to purchase and customize
equipment for the power plant, who then contracted with Rountree
Transport and Rigging, Inc. (“Rountree”) to transport the combustion
turbine.120 As the Rountree transporters were adjusting the height of
the rig on the tracks, the collision took place.121 A series of lawsuits
ensued between the parties and their insurers.122 The district court
separated the suit into a liability phase and a damages phase.123
Of the questions certified to the Florida Supreme Court, the first
regarded a comparative fault issue, and the other three regarded indemnification agreements and sovereign immunity issues.124 The first
question arose as a result of AHA’s argument to the Eleventh Circuit
that its damages should not be limited under the comparative fault
principles of section 768.81, Florida Statutes, particularly subsections (2) and (3).125 The statute codified the holding of Hoffman v.
Jones,126 and “[n]othing in the legislative history of this statute indicates an intention other than a direct codification of this Court’s
adoption of comparative liability.”127
The first certified question, “Should a vicariously liable party have
the negligence of the active tortfeasor apportioned to it under Florida
Statute § 768.81 such that recovery of its own damages is reduced
concomitantly?,”128 asks whether, under Florida’s comparative fault
law, a vicariously liable party should have the active tortfeasor’s negligence apportioned to it.129
AHA argued that because “fault” is used, but neither it nor its
subrogor were directly negligent, the comparative fault statute was
inapplicable.130 The railroads, however, focused on the plain meaning
of the word “chargeable” and contended that it is broad enough to in-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id. at 462-63.
Section 768.81, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
(2) Effect of contributory fault.—In an action to which this section applies,
any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately
the amount awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.
(3) Apportionment of damages.—In cases to which this section applies, the
court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party’s
percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability . . . .
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2)-(3) (2005).
126. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
127. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 469.
128. Id. at 466 (emphasis omitted).
129. Id. at 469.
130. Id. at 465-66.
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clude vicariously liable parties.131 The court concluded in favor of the
railroads, noting that AHA’s interpretation would render “chargeable” as surplusage and that vicarious liability always involves liability without fault but still carries the entire burden of the active tortfeasor.132 Thus, the statute applied to vicariously liable parties, as
well as active tortfeasors.133 Furthermore, it noted as a matter of policy, “it would be a dangerous precedent to allow insurers, through
subrogation, to have a greater right to damages than their insureds.”134
The court then ruled on the second certified question: “Given that
Kissimmee Utility Authority, a municipal agency under Florida law,
agreed by contract to indemnify a private party, is the agreement
controlled by the restrictions on waiver of sovereign immunity found
in Florida Statute § 768.28?”135 Before this statute was enacted, the
state and counties were immune from tort liability, but municipalities were not immune.136 However, municipalities were still included
within the definition of “state agencies or subdivisions” within this
statute.
When the legislature abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity,
which the Florida Constitution gives it the power to do, the waiver
must be “clear and unequivocal,” must be “strictly construe[d]” by the
Court, and will not be found as a product of inference or implication.137 In light of this, the court concluded that the indemnification
provision, in which “KUA agreed to assume responsibility for the
negligence of CSX and its employees and for that of companies affiliated with CSX . . . [and] placed no limit on the amount KUA has to
pay out per claimant and per accident,” was based on a disagreement
over breach of contract, so the waiver for tort liability did not ap131. Id. at 466.
132. Id. at 471.
133. Id. at 470-71.
134. Id. at 471.
135. Id. at 467 (emphasis omitted). Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself
and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law
against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in
tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while
acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this
state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (2005).
136. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 472.
137. Id.
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ply.138 Thus, KUA’s payout was not limited by subsection (5) of the
statute, which allows $100,000 per claimant and $200,000 per accident.139 Consequently, the court answered the second certified question in the negative.140
Justice Quince, who concurred in part and dissented in part, rejected this conclusion stating, “While the crossing agreement is a
contract, the provision at issue clearly relates to tort liability.”141 This
is problematic because then the state can contract to do what it does
not otherwise have the power to do, “i.e., waive sovereign immunity
for tort liability beyond the limits specified by the Legislature in section 768.28.”142 Quince further emphasized that if a government entity cannot indemnify a second government entity for the second’s
negligence without express statutory authorization, then it does not
follow that the first government entity should be able to indemnify a
private party for its negligence.143 Thus, Quince reasoned that the indemnity clause between KUA and CSX should be limited by the restrictions in section 768.28, Florida Statutes.144
Quince’s position highlighted that the majority decision may allow
the governmental entities to circumvent the law, which would then
essentially render the law meaningless. Justice Cantero’s concur138. Id. at 473.
139. Id. at 474. Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, provides:
The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the
period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall
be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the
sum of $100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or
subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of
$200,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in
excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to
$100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the judgment
that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be
paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. Notwithstanding
the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided herein, the state or an
agency or subdivision thereof may agree, within the limits of insurance coverage provided, to settle a claim made or a judgment rendered against it without
further action by the Legislature, but the state or agency or subdivision thereof
shall not be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity or to
have increased the limits of its liability as a result of its obtaining insurance
coverage for tortious acts in excess of the $100,000 or $200,000 waiver provided
above. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall apply to the
state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agencies
or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity before July 1, 1974.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2005).
140. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 474.
141. Id. at 480 (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 480-81.
144. Id. at 482.
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rence noted, in a historical overview of sovereign immunity, that the
dissent’s position may have merit in a discussion regarding a state
and its agencies but emphasized that position “ignores the broad
powers conferred on municipalities to ‘exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.’ ”145 Furthermore, Cantero pointed out that the statute granted immunity to municipalities where they previously had none, so this derogation of
common law must be strictly construed.146 Because the statute actually granted the municipalities immunity above the common law limits but granted states immunity up to specified limits, the statute
“must be construed in favor of granting immunity to the state, but
against granting it to a municipality.”147
The court then turned to the third certified question, which also
regarded sovereign immunity: “Is the indemnification agreement instead controlled by the rule for breach-of-contract actions enunciated
in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections?”148 This case
held that the state is not immune from contracts that it enters into
because the contracts should be binding and enforceable on both parties.149
The court distinguished that case from the present one because
Pan-Am involved a state and the present case involves a municipality, which has the power to execute contracts and be liable for its
breach.150 This power stems from Florida’s Constitution, which “gives
municipalities ‘governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to
enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions and render municipal services . . . except as otherwise provided by law,’ ”151 and the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, which
recognizes the same powers that are limited only when “expressly
prohibited by law.”152
The court concluded that even before Pan-Am, KUA and other
municipalities already had the power to execute contracts.153 It also
noted that even if KUA did need express authorization to execute the
crossing agreement, section 163.01(15)(k), Florida Statutes,154 pro145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 477 (Cantero, J., concurring) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 467 (majority opinion) (emphasis and citation omitted).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 475 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b)).
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1997)).
Id.
This provision provides:
(15) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or of any other law
except s. 361.14, any public agency of this state which is an electric utility, or
any separate legal entity created pursuant to the provisions of this section, the
membership of which consists only of electric utilities, and which exercises or
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vided express authorization.155 Thus, KUA could not invoke sovereign
immunity to relieve itself from liability under the contract.156
The dissent agreed with the majority that KUA had the authority
to contract for municipal services, including the crossing agreement.157 “However, both the constitutional provision and the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act recognize that the powers of a municipality may be limited when ‘otherwise provided by law.’ ”158 Thus, even
though KUA had authority to contract, it did not have the authority
to extend the government’s liability beyond section 768.28 by changing the indemnity agreement.159 Pan-Am held that a state agency
could not claim a sovereign immunity defense in a breach of contract
action based on a written contract that the state had authority to enter.160 Thus, because KUA did not have authority to enter into the indemnity agreement provision of the contract, the indemnity agreement was not controlled by Pan-Am.161 The dissent, like the majority,
answered the third question in the negative but under this different
reasoning.162
Because the third question was answered in the negative, the
fourth question (“If Pan-Am applies, does a municipal agency like
Kissimmee Utility Authority lose the protection of sovereign immunity only if it has specific statutory authorization to enter into indemnification agreements, or is it sufficient that the agency more
generally has statutory authorization to contract with private parties?”) was not addressed.163

proposes to exercise the powers granted by part II of chapter 361, the Joint
Power Act, may exercise any or all of the following powers:
....
(k) The limitations on waiver in the provisions of s. 768.28 or any other law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature, in accordance with s. 13, Art. X
of the State Constitution, hereby declares that any such legal entity or any
public agency of this state that participates in any electric project waives its
sovereign immunity to:
1. All other persons participating therein; and
2. Any person in any manner contracting with a legal entity of which any such
public agency is a member, with relation to:
a. Ownership, operation, or any other activity set forth in sub-subparagraph
(b)2.d. with relation to any electric project; or
b. The supplying or purchasing of services, output, capacity, energy, or any
combination thereof.
FLA. STAT. § 163.01(15).
155. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 476.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 481 (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 482.
160. Id. at 479.
161. Id. at 481-82.
162. Id. at 482.
163. Id. at 463, 467, 476 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted).
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Upon answering the certified questions, the court returned the
case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for disposition.164 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion based on these
answers, holding that the district court properly assigned the fault of
the active tortfeasor to the subrogee in accordance with the Florida
Supreme Court’s conclusion that section 768.81, Florida Statutes,
applied to vicariously liable parties.165 Also, in combination with further reasoning by the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court’s
answers to the second and third questions led the Eleventh Circuit to
conclude that the indemnification provision of the contract was
valid.166
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE—APPEAL AND ERROR—PLAINTIFF HAS AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO AMEND A COMPLAINT ONCE AS A MATTER OF
COURSE BEFORE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING IS SERVED AND A TRIAL
COURT HAS NO DISCRETION TO DENY SUCH AN AMENDMENT; A
DEFENDANT MAY ASSERT AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, INCLUDING THE
DEFENSE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION, IN A MOTION TO DISMISS; AND AN
APPELLATE COURT MAY, IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, IMPOSE
SANCTIONS ON AN APPELLEE OR ITS LAWYER FOR FRIVOLOUS DEFENSE
OF A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS TRIAL COURT ORDER—Boca Burger, Inc.
v. Forum (Boca Burger II), 912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005).
The Florida Supreme Court used its discretionary jurisdiction
pursuant to article III, section 3, subsection (b)(3) of the Florida Constitution167 to resolve a conflict between the Second and Fourth District Court of Appeal concerning “whether a trial court has discretion
to deny a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once before a responsive pleading is served.”168 In Volpicella v. Volpicella, the Second
District held that under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure “a party
may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served” but also noted that “[t]his rule
has not yet been construed as depriving a trial court of discretion to
withhold leave to amend a pleading to which no response has been
served.”169 Subsequently, in Forum v. Boca Burger, Inc. (Boca Burger
164. Id. at 476.
165. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Rountree Transp. & Rigging, Inc., 422
F.3d 1275, 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 1283, 1285.
167. That subsection provides that the Florida Supreme Court:
May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares
valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district
court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.
FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(b)(3).
168. Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum (Boca Burger II), 912 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 2005).
169. 136 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
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I), the Fourth District noted that although the Volpicella decision
“[found] a residual discretion in the trial judge to deny leave to
amend when sought by a party before the filing of a responsive pleading,” it “doubt[ed] the correctness of the second district’s assertion of
residual discretion [because] Rule 1.190(a) [Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure] states a rule, not a discretion, as regards to amending before a responsive pleading is filed.”170
Additionally, the court held that by accepting jurisdiction to review the conflict between the districts, it also had “authority to address other issues properly raised.”171 Thus, the court also addressed
the issues of whether a defendant may assert an affirmative defense,
specifically the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss
and whether “an appellate court may . . . impose sanctions on an appellee or its lawyer for its frivolous defense of a patently erroneous
trial court order.”172 This Note first briefly outlines the procedural
history preceding the court’s decision and then examines the court’s
treatment of the above issues in the order presented.
Forum filed an action against Boca Burger, Inc. for declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.173 “Boca Burger filed a motion to
dismiss with prejudice, arguing that Forum’s complaint failed to
state a cause of action and was otherwise preempted by federal and
[Florida] law” and subsequently scheduled a hearing.174 On the day of
the hearing, Forum filed an amended complaint without leave of
court,175 alleging additional statutory and common law violations.176
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge refused to
recognize the amended complaint as filed and granted Boca Burger’s
motion to dismiss the original complaint with prejudice on the
grounds that the claims were preempted by federal and Florida
law.177 Forum appealed the trial court’s decision, and on appeal the
Fourth District reversed, holding that the “essential problem” with
Boca Burger’s argument that Forum’s claims were preempted by fed170. 788 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
171. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 563 (citing its previous decision in Savoie v. State,
422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982), for the proposition that “once the Supreme Court accepts
jurisdiction over a case to resolve the legal issue in conflict, it may, in its discretion, consider other issues properly raised and argued before the Supreme Court”).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 563-64.
175. Id. at 564. The amended complaint was filed by “new (though not substitute)
counsel.” Id. The trial judge expressed two problems with the amended complaint: “[T]he
complaint had been amended without leave of court, and the lawyer at the hearing was not
the lawyer who had signed the original complaint on the plaintiff’s behalf.” Boca Burger I,
788 So. 2d at 1058.
176. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 564.
177. Id. at 565.
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eral law was that the argument was “raised at the wrong time, under
the auspices of the wrong motion.”178 The Fourth District reasoned
that “the pre-emption defense is an avoidance, not a real defense,
[that] should be pleaded as an affirmative defense and resolved . . .
on motion for summary judgment.”179 Regarding the trial court’s decision to dismiss Forum’s complaint, the Fourth District held:
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served. With the case having
proceeded only as far as the filing of an original complaint and a
motion to dismiss, the [trial] court had no discretion to refuse to
accept the new pleading.180

Further, the Fourth District found that “Boca Burger’s counsel misled the trial court into believing that it had discretion to refuse Forum’s amended complaint,” concluded that “counsel could not have
made such an argument in good faith at either the trial or appellate
levels,” and “imposed trial and appellate court sanctions against
Boca Burger’s counsel.”181 Boca Burger appealed the Fourth District’s
decision.
On review, the Florida Supreme Court first pointed to the plain
language of Rule 1.190(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed on the trial calendar, may so amend it at any
time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party. If a party files a motion to amend a pleading,
the party shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires.
A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10
days after service of the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders.182

The court reasoned that “by its terms the rule provides for amendment of as right (first sentence) and amendment by agreement or
leave of court (second sentence), depending on the circumstances.”183

178. Boca Burger I, 788 So. 2d at 1061.
179. Id. at 1062 (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(d) in support of its holding).
180. Id. at 1057. The Fourth District emphasized that “[a] motion to dismiss is not a
‘responsive pleading’ because it is not even a pleading.” Id. (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.100(a),
which designates permissible pleadings, provides that “[n]o other pleadings shall be allowed,” and does not include a motion to dismiss in its list of permissible pleadings).
181. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 565.
182. Id. at 566-67 (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.190(a)).
183. Id. at 567.
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The court acknowledged that the first sentence of Rule 1.190(a)
“grants plaintiffs an automatic right to amend the complaint once before a responsive pleading is served.”184 Further, the court held that
“the filing of a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiff’s absolute right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course” as “a
motion to dismiss is not a ‘responsive pleading’ because it is not a
‘pleading’ under the rules.”185 Applying these principles to the decision under review, the court held:
Because Boca Burger had not served its answer, and had only filed
a motion to dismiss, Forum had the right to file an amended complaint, even if that amendment was filed on the day of—or even
just before—the hearing on Boca Burger’s motion to dismiss the
original complaint.186

Next, the court clarified the time at which a judge’s discretion to
deny amendment of a complaint arises:
A judge’s discretion to deny amendment of a complaint arises
only after the defendant files an answer or if the plaintiff already
has exercised the right to amend once. At that time, the second
and fourth sentences of rule 1.190(a) apply: “Otherwise a party
may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party. . . . Leave of court shall be given freely when
justice so requires.”187

The court noted several cases that have acknowledged a court’s discretion to deny amendment of a complaint but clarified that all these
cases “concerned either a plaintiff’s second (or subsequent) amendment or an amendment requested after the answer was filed.”188 Consequently, the court approved the Fourth District’s holding that “a
court has no discretion to deny an amendment under the first sentence of the rule” and disapproved Volpicella “to the extent it holds
that a trial court retains any discretion to deny an amendment under
[the first sentence of the rule]—regardless of whether the plaintiff
simply files an amended complaint or requests leave of court to file
one.”189
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (“The rule clearly grants a plaintiff one free amendment to perfect the complaint before an answer is served.”).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 567-68 (citing Fla. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1st DCA 2002); Dimick v. Ray, 774 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Kohn v. City of Miami
Beach, 611 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Bouldin v. Okaloosa County, 580 So. 2d 205
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Adams v. Knabb Turpentine Co., 435 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);
and Highlands County Sch. Bd. v. K.D. Hedin Constr., Inc., 382 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980) as examples).
189. Id. at 568. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis argued
that the majority and the Fourth District incorrectly determined that this case turned on
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As discussed above, in accepting jurisdiction to resolve a conflict
between the district courts of appeal, the supreme court has discretion to address other issues properly raised on appeal,190 and in the
instant case, the court used its discretionary jurisdiction to address
the issue of whether a defendant may assert an affirmative defense,
specifically the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss.191 In overruling the Fourth District’s holding “that Boca Burger
could only plead the preemption defense as an affirmative defense,
and therefore the issue could only be resolved on motion for summary
judgment,”192 the court reasoned that “the issue of federal preemption
is a question of subject matter jurisdiction [and that] lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may be properly asserted in a motion to dismiss.”193 Thus, the court held that “[a] defendant may, at its option,
raise any affirmative defense, including the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss.”194
Additionally, the court used its discretionary jurisdiction to address the issue of whether an appellate court may impose sanctions
on an appellee or its lawyer for its frivolous defense of a patently erroneous trial court order. As previously discussed, the Fourth District imposed sanctions on Boca Burger for advocating, at both the
trial and appellate levels, that the trial court had discretion to deny
Forum’s amendment of the original complaint. The court noted that
the trial court had not imposed sanctions for Boca Burger’s actions
and held that “no authority exists for an appellate court’s imposition
of sanctions for conduct occurring in the trial court.”195 Conversely,
the court held that, on appeal, “a district court may, in appropriate
circumstances, impose sanctions for counsel’s defense of a patently
erroneous order [in front of the appellate court].”196 However, the

law applicable to “a simple and routine filing of an amended complaint,” as the amendment
to the complaint at issue was far from routine as it contained “a multitude of defects and
failures to follow the Rules of Judicial Administration.” Id. at 581 (Lewis, J., dissenting)
(indicating defects of the amendment, such as the fact that the signatures on the complaint
were not those of Forum’s attorney of record).
190. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
191. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 568 (majority opinion).
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.140(b) as supporting authority) (citations omitted).
194. Id. However, the court noted that “when a defendant asserts such a defense in a
motion to dismiss, a trial court must determine the issue as a matter of law based only on
the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, assuming the truth of the facts asserted.” Id.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis argued that “[t]he question seized upon by the district court as to how preemption is to be presented (motion to
dismiss or affirmative defense) was never asserted, discussed, or preserved for appellate
consideration.” Id. at 582 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 569 (majority opinion) (“If the district court was concerned with counsel’s
conduct in the trial court, the proper procedure would have been to remand for the circuit
court to allow the trial court to determine for itself whether to impose sanctions.”).
196. Id.
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court found that the record lacked sufficient information for it to determine “how much, if any, of the district court’s decision was based
on counsel’s conduct on appeal” and, therefore, determined that the
proper outcome was to remand the case to the Fourth District for the
court to determine whether sanctions for Boca Burger’s, or its counsel’s, conduct before the Fourth District are appropriate.197
Additionally, the court provided guidance as to what constitutes
“appropriate circumstances” for imposing sanctions.198 The court
noted that recent revisions to section 57.105, Florida Statutes,
greatly expand a litigant’s ability to obtain sanctions against an opponent who raises unsupported claims or defenses.199 Further the
court found that, “as a matter of law,” section 57.105, Florida Statutes, is not limited in applicability to appellants.200 Thus, even
though

197. Id. at 574 (“If [on remand] the district court does impose sanctions, it should state
clearly whether its sanctions are to be imposed against Boca Burger itself, its counsel, or
both” and that the Fourth District “may also remand to the trial court [so that the trial
court can determine] whether to impose sanctions for conduct that occurred in that court”).
The court instructed that, on remand, the district court should “reconsider its order imposing sanctions, addressing only conduct on appeal.” Id.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis took issue with the majority’s failure to consider the trial court record and argued:
The transcript of the trial level hearing and the form of the dismissal with
prejudice belies the district court’s analysis and that of the majority with regard to the Rule of Civil Procedure being the controlling issue in the trial court
and demonstrates that the dismissal represented an arguable decision by the
trial court on the substance of the core claim and defense, correctly or incorrectly, which remains as an arguable controlling issue. As recognized by the
majority, the issue of preemption is fundamental to the power of the court to
act and is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any
time. In my view, on these facts and Florida law at that time, it was not sanctionable for this attorney to attempt to support the trial judge’s decision with
regard to the judicial administration rules or to assert a lack of jurisdiction due
to preemption as a matter of law. Although the majority proclaims that today it
has not punished counsel, it has returned this case to the district court of appeal for consideration to do so tomorrow, as a result that is, in my view, incorrect as a matter of law and accompanied by the incorrect concepts that the trial
level proceedings are “moot,” the propriety of a court’s decision is irrelevant to
the consideration of punishment of a party due to the position it asserts, and
the announced basis of a court’s order is unimportant in analyzing whether an
order is “patently erroneous.” This case has simply become misdirected and
should not be remanded for sanctions, but returned to the trial court for the
case to proceed.
Id. at 584 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 569-74 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 569-71 (holding that under the revised version of section 57.105, Florida
Statutes, sanctions are available upon a showing “that the party and counsel ‘knew or
should have known’ that any claim or defense asserted was (a) not supported by the facts
or (b) not supported by an application of ‘then-existing’ law”).
200. Id. at 570 (analyzing section 57.105, Florida Statutes, and holding that “an appellee is not shielded as a matter of law from the imposition of sanctions in an appropriate
case”).
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an appellee, by definition, is defending an order of the trial court
[and] [a]ppellate courts, therefore, should impose sanctions against
an appellee only in rare circumstances. . . . [A]n appellee cannot
hide behind the “presumption of correctness” of an order that the
appellee itself procured by misrepresenting the law or the facts.201

Finally, the court found that appellate counsel “has an independent ethical obligation to present both the facts and the applicable law
accurately and forthrightly” and noted that this obligation “will
sometimes require appellate counsel to concede error where, although trial counsel obtained a favorable result, either the facts were
not as represented to the trial court or the law is clearly contrary to
the appellee’s position and no good-faith basis exists to argue that it
should be changed.”202 However, the court clarified that this ethical
obligation does not require “appellate counsel [to] concede error
[based on] the statistical chances for reversal.”203 Instead, counsel
must concede error only where defending the trial court’s ruling
would be tantamount to defending an “indefensible” order.204 Notwithstanding the court’s explicit holding, it remains to be seen how
often Florida attorneys will erroneously request sanctions against
appellees who are legitimately defending a trial court’s order because
they believe the court’s order to be patently erroneous.
201. Id. at 571 (“The presumption of correctness is necessarily based on another presumption: that the appellee correctly informed the trial court of the facts and applicable
law.”).
202. Id.
203. Id. This ruling responded to Boca Burger’s argument that “adopting a rule allowing sanctions against appellees will require ‘the extreme, indeed unprofessional act, of
throwing in the towel when there is any chance that an order may be reversed on appeal.’ ”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. In support of this ruling, the court cited Florida decisions for the proposition
that an attorney’s obligation to pursue his or her client’s lawful objectives cannot be used
to “justify unprofessional conduct by elevating the perceived duty to zealously represent
over all other duties.” Id. (citing Lingle v. Dion, 776 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001)). Additionally, the court referenced section 57.105, Florida Statutes, the Florida Bar
rules of professional conduct, and the oath of admission to the Florida Bar as warnings
“that counsel must be governed by considerations other than mere zealous advocacy for the
client.” Id. at 571-72. Further, the court cited twenty-six published opinions since the beginning of 2004 in which the state of Florida has conceded error on appeal, id. at 572 n.5,
and thirteen published opinions since the beginning of 2003 in which civil litigants have
conceded error on appeal, id. at 572 n.6, and reasoned that “the sheer number of such cases
demonstrates that not only do the rules require counsel to concede error in appropriate
cases [but also that] counsel can and do adhere to these rules in practice.” Id. at 572. Finally, the court excerpted a portion of the Fourth District’s opinion concerning the “lawyer’s duty of candor to a tribunal” in support of its holding that conceding error on appeal
is professional:
Even if it hurts the strategy and tactics of a party’s counsel, even if it prepares
the way for an adverse ruling, even though the adversary has himself failed to
cite the correct law, the lawyer is required to disclose law favoring his adversary when the court is obviously under an erroneous impression as to the law’s
requirements.
Id. at 573.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—TAXATION—FLORIDA STATUTE PROHIBITING
ASSESSMENT OF VALUE FOR THE TAX YEAR ON REAL PROPERTY
IMPROVEMENTS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED ON JANUARY 1
COMPORTS WITH THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION’S JUST VALUATION
REQUIREMENT—Sunset Harbour Condominium Ass’n v. Robbins, 914
So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005).
Recently the Florida Supreme Court held that section 192.042(1),
Florida Statutes, which prohibits assessment of value on real property improvements “not substantially completed on January 1,”205
comports with the Florida Constitution’s just valuation requirement.206 In making this determination, the court differentiated between assessment statutes that exempt certain real property from a
fair market valuation and statutes that merely delay a fair market
valuation.207
The Florida Constitution requires that all property be assessed a
just valuation for the purposes of determining appropriate ad valorem taxation.208 It provides for only five exceptions to this rule, relating to matters of agricultural land, certain types of personal tangible
property related to trade and livestock, homestead exemptions, historic properties, and additional homestead exemptions regarding improvements to land for the purpose of serving certain family members.209 The Florida Constitution further charges the legislature with
determining the manner in which the “just valuation” is assessed.210
Just valuation, for the purposes of this context, is synonymous with
“fair market value.”211
Sunset Harbour Condominium (“Sunset”) was in its final phase of
construction as of January 1, 1997.212 The local property appraiser
(Robbins) determined that the construction was “substantially complete” and assessed the property at a value of nearly $23 million.213
When Sunset’s owners association filed suit to challenge Robbins’ determination that the construction was “substantially complete,”
205. The relevant provision reads:
All property shall be assessed according to its just value as follows:
(1) Real property, on January 1 of each year. Improvements or portions not
substantially completed on January 1 shall have no value placed thereon.
“Substantially completed” shall mean that the improvement or some selfsufficient unit within it can be used for the purpose for which it was constructed.
FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (2005).
206. Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 927 (2005).
207. Id. at 931 (citing Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers E., Inc., 212 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1968)).
208. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
209. Id. § 4(a)-(e).
210. Id. § 4.
211. Sunset Harbour, 914 So. 2d at 928 n.4.
212. Id. at 927.
213. Id. The exact amount of the assessment was $22,935,100. Id.
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rather than defend his determination, Robbins instead argued that
section 192.042’s requirement of substantial completion was unconstitutional in that it prevented a just valuation of the condominium.214 Both the trial and the appellate courts agreed with Robbins.215
The Florida Supreme Court, however, disagreed.216 Robbins
largely relied on Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder.217 The
statute at issue in Interlachen required that “ ‘platted lands unsold
as lots shall be valued for tax assessment purposes on the same basis
as any unplatted acreage of similar character until 60 percent of such
lands included in one plat shall have been sold as individual lots.’ ”218
In holding that statute unconstitutional, the Interlachen court
stated, “ ‘It is true that the constitutional provision allows the Legislature to prescribe regulations for the purpose of securing a just
valuation of all property, but such regulations must apply to all
property and not to any one particular class.’ ”219 By taxing similar
property differently based upon ownership—that is, the plotted land
was assessed at its fair market value if it was sold, but assessed as
without value if not sold—the statute, in essence, created a regime
that granted developers (owners of vast tracks of unsold plotted
lands) a low assessment on the same property that was given a fair
market assessment to individual home owners.220 In short, the statute in Interlachen “did not permit a ‘just valuation’ of all property.”221
The Sunset court compared the statute in Interlachen with what it
declared to be the more relevant precedent, Culbertson v. Seacoast
Towers East, Inc.222 The Culbertson court, regarding a statute similar
to the one at issue in Sunset, stated:
The statute constitutes only a temporary postponement of valuation and assessment of incomplete improvements on real property
provided the prescribed conditions are met on the annual assessment date. The requirement is simply that the separate classification of such property shall bear some reasonable relationship to
the legislative power to prescribe regulations to secure a just
evaluation of property. Factors analogous to those here involved

214.
215.
216.
217.
1973)).
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
1968)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 931 (citing Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
Id. (quoting Interlachen, 304 So. 2d at 434).
Id. (quoting Interlachen, 304 So. 2d at 434).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 929-30 (citing Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers East, Inc., 212 So. 2d 646 (Fla.
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have in numerous instances been made the basis for special statutory treatment.223

The Sunset court similarly concluded that the present statute’s prohibition against assessment of value to nonsubstantially completed
improvements as merely determining the timing of when a fair market assessment will be made.224 Although the Florida Constitution
requires the legislature to secure a just valuation on all property, a
requirement which the Interlachen statute ran afoul, it permits the
method for achieving a just valuation, including the timing of the assessment, to the legislature’s discretion.225
The Sunset court was also emphatic that the revisions of the Florida Constitution after the decision in Culbertson did not affect its
holding.226 It specifically found “no basis to believe the 1968 revisions
to the just valuation provision were intended by the drafters or the
public to invalidate the substantial completion statute.”227
The Sunset court therefore found Culbertson’s rule to still be valid
and enunciated that the statute directing that just valuation be
withheld from an improvement to real property until the improvement is substantially completed to be well within the legislature’s
discretion granted by the Florida Constitution.228 Whereas the Interlachen statute created a scheme where similar parcels of real property were assessed (and therefore taxed) differently based upon who
owned the property, the statute in Sunset uniformly taxed similar
property (real property with undergoing improvements) the same
way. The Sunset court also enunciated that the statute “prescribes
reasonable guidelines for valuation of incomplete improvements for
property tax purposes, which infuse uniformity and certainty in ad
valorem taxation.”229 The court even suggested that “[t]he absence of
a ‘substantial completion’ statute would only promote uncertainty
and encourage litigation.”230 In conclusion, the rule in Sunset permits
the legislature to temporarily delay the assessment of a fair market
value on improved real property when its improvements are not substantially completed by January 1 of each year.231

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. (quoting Culbertson, 212 So. 2d at 647).
Id. at 931-32.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id. at 932.
Id.
Id.
Id.

